The Effects of Price Cap Regulation on Tobacco Market by Diana Soraia Ferreira da Moita
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Price Cap Regulation on Tobacco Market 
 
 
by 
 
Diana Soraia Ferreira da Moita 
 
 
 
 
Master in Economics Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervised by:  
Paula Sarmento, PhD 
 
 
2014
i 
 
Biographic Note 
 
 
Diana Soraia Ferreira da Moita was born in the city of Viseu, Portugal, on August 19, 
1991. 
In September 2009 she started the undergraduate studies in Economics from the 
Department of Economics, Management and Industrial Engineering of University of 
Aveiro, having finished it on July 2012. 
This dissertation is a component of the Master of Economics of Faculty of Economy of 
University of Porto which she is attending since September 2012. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who helped me on the elaboration 
of this dissertation.  
I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Doctor Paula Sarmento, for her guidance, 
assistance and presence whenever it was necessary. Their advices and suggestions were 
indispensable to accomplish this work. 
For the motivation, patience and unconditional support I am also thankful to all my 
family and friends, particularly to Nelson, my parents, my sister and my brother.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
 
The tobacco market has serious market failures that justify tobacco regulation. Besides 
being an addictive good with severe consequences for health, the worldwide tobacco 
industry is characterized by high concentration and consequently by the presence of 
market power exerted by tobacco manufacturers.  
The intention of this work is to study the economic effects of an innovative method to 
regulate the tobacco market: price cap regulation applied to tobacco producers. Price 
cap regulation has already been applied in many sectors around the world. However it 
was never related to tobacco market until 2010. In this work, it is developed a 
theoretical model with two periods where an upstream firm, subject to price cap 
constraint, sells to the downstream firms. Additionally the strategic behavior of the 
upstream firm and the asymmetric costs between downstream firms is also object of 
study. The model shows the impact of price regulation, the upstream behavior and the 
asymmetric costs on the market variables. The results indicate that price cap regulation 
reduces producer’s profits when this firm does not behave strategically and also that the 
consumers benefit from lower prices. However, if the tobacco retail price does not 
change, the government revenue will be increased and consumers only benefit from 
higher quantities. Regarding the cost asymmetry, a curious result is that it can be 
profitable for the upstream firm if there are asymmetric costs between his customers.  
 
JEL codes: C72, L51, L66 
Keywords: Tobacco Industry, Economic Regulation, Price Cap 
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Resumo 
 
O mercado de tabaco tem sérias falhas de mercado que justificam a sua regulação. Para 
além de ser um bem aditivo, com consequências graves para a saúde, a indústria 
mundial do tabaco é caracterizada por ser altamente concentrada e, consequentemente, 
pela presença de poder de mercado exercido pelos produtores de tabaco. 
O objectivo deste trabalho é estudar os efeitos económicos de um método inovador para 
regular o mercado do tabaco: regulação price-cap aplicada aos produtores de tabaco. 
Este tipo de regulação já tem sido aplicado em diversos sectores em todo mundo mas 
nunca foi relacionado ao mercado do tabaco até 2010. Neste trabalho é desenvolvido um 
modelo teórico com dois períodos onde uma empresa a montante, sujeita a restrição de 
preço, vende para as empresas a jusante. Adicionalmente, o comportamento estratégico 
da empresa a montante e a existência de custos assimétricos entre as empresas a jusante 
é também objecto de estudo. O modelo mostra o impacto da regulação de preços, do 
comportamento a montante e dos custos assimétricos nas variáveis de mercado. Os 
resultados indicam que este regime regulatório reduz os lucros do produtor quando este 
não se comporta de forma estratégica e também que os consumidores beneficiam de 
preços mais baixos. No entanto, se o preço de retalho não se alterar a receita fiscal 
aumentará e os consumidores apenas beneficiarão de mais quantidades disponíveis. No 
que diz respeito à assimetria de custos, um resultado curioso é que pode ser lucrativo 
para a empresa a montante se existirem custos assimétricos entre os seus clientes. 
 
Códigos JEL: C72, L51, L66 
Palavras-Chave: Indústria do Tabaco, Regulação Económica, Price Cap 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
Economic regulation is necessary when there are market failures that significantly 
damage the market efficiency as it is the case of the tobacco industry. This market has 
obvious failures not only caused by externalities and lack of information but also due to 
the market power exercised by the so-called "Big Four" (Philip Morris International, 
British American Tobacco, Japan Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco) of the tobacco 
industry which together represent about 70% of world market share (Bialous and 
Peeters 2012). According to the fourth edition of The Tobacco Atlas
1, the profit’s 
combination of the mentioned companies was 35 billion dollars in 2010 which 
corresponds to the combined profits of the Microsoft, Coca-Cola and Mc Donald’s 
(Eriksen et al. 2012). 
The tobacco industry is currently subject to several forms of regulation which try to 
achieve quite different objectives. The World Health Organization (WHO) divided 
those measures according two different aims: the reduction of the demand for tobacco 
and the reduction of the tobacco supply. In addition there are other policies to protect 
the environment (Nunes 2014). In order to reduce the demand the following measures, 
among others, can be applied: 
 Price and tax measures (price and tax policies, prohibiting or restricting sales 
and imports by international travelers of tax and duty-free tobacco products). 
 Ban tobacco smoking in indoor workplaces and public places (including public 
transports). 
 Disclosure, to the Government and the public, information about contents and 
emissions of tobacco products (by manufacturers or importers of tobacco 
products). 
                                                        
1
 Document published in 2012 by the American Cancer Society and World Lung Foundation that includes 
all the statistical information about tobacco and tobacco industry. 
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 Regulation of the packaging and labeling of tobacco products (no advertising or 
promotion on packaging, health warnings describing the harmful effects of 
tobacco consumption, etc.) 
 Educational and public awareness programmes. 
 Ban all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. 
In order to reduce the supply the following measures, among others, can be applied: 
 Measures to reduce illicit trade in tobacco products (requiring the marking of all 
unit packets and packages of tobacco products, facilitating the information 
exchange between customs, tax and other authorities, strengthen legislation with 
penalties and remedies against illicit trade, etc.) 
 Prohibition of sales of tobacco products to and by minors. 
Nevertheless, tobacco was responsible for 6 million deaths worldwide in 2011 and in 
2008 were produced 5.9 trillion cigarettes. In Portugal most of the measures mentioned 
above are actually in force. The strongest measure was instituted by Law No. 37/2007, 
of August 14, which entered into force on the 1st of January 2008. That law approves 
rules for citizens’ protection from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke and measures 
to reduce demand related to dependency and its consumption cessation, namely the 
prohibition of smoking in certain places and the sponsorship of any activities that 
directly or indirectly promote tobacco products. However, annual cigarette consumption 
was 1114 per capita, 17% of male deaths and 3.0% of female deaths are due to tobacco, 
in 2004. Additionally, the illicit cigarette market share was 6.3% (Eriksen et al. 2012). 
Regarding the tobacco supply the policies are few, compared with policies to reduce the 
demand for tobacco, or are ineffective in reaching one of the major problems on tobacco 
manufacturers: the abnormal profits earned by the tobacco transnational companies. 
Thus, in the recent years, has raised the need for further action in this area. Gilmore et 
al. (2010) suggest an innovative way to regulate tobacco market that could reduce 
companies’ profits, increase government revenue and also bring benefits for public 
health, goals very difficult to promote simultaneously. What they propose is the 
application of price cap regulation to tobacco manufacturers. This type of regulation 
was never related to tobacco market until the work of those authors. Therefore, this 
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dissertation follow the suggestion of Gilmore et al. (2010) and focuses on the analysis 
of the effects of price cap regulation on tobacco market. The research questions can be 
synthesized by the following questions: “Does price cap regulation reduce producer’s 
profits?” and “How price cap regulation affects the government revenue and consumer 
welfare?” To answer those questions, we intend to model the idea of Gilmore et al. 
(2010) and thereby be able to evaluate the welfare on three different economic agents: 
producers, government and consumers. Thus, the methodology of the dissertation 
involves the construction of a theoretical model inspired by the Portuguese tobacco 
industry. 
Price cap regulation was developed in United Kingdom in the 1980’s in the 
telecommunications industry (Armstrong et al. 1994). It consists in fixing a maximum 
price that companies can charge during a certain period of regulation, typically one 
year. This maximum price is equal to the price observed in the previous period adjusted 
by the inflation, the expected efficiency gains and eventually by exogenous costs not 
controlled by the firms. The expected efficiency gains are usually defined for a more 
largely period of regulation, typically between three and five years. It is known that the 
price cap system is used in many markets particularly in utilities but, as far as we know, 
it was never applied in the tobacco industry, whose main regulation instruments are the 
taxation of tobacco products and anti-smoking legislation, hence our interest and 
relevance in studying this topic. This is an unexplored topic that deserves to be studied 
taking into account the characteristics of the market and the product in question. The 
implementation of such a regime could be an important and relevant instrument in 
tobacco regulation. 
This work is organized as follows: the literature review is presented on Chapter 2 and is 
divided in two different parts. The first part describes the literature already done about 
tobacco industry and the second part review the price cap regulation. On Chapter 3 is 
described the Portuguese tobacco industry, in particular the market structure on both 
production and distribution markets. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the model’s construction, 
where the hypothesis and variables are defined, the model is solved and all the results 
are discussed. Finally, on Chapter 5 are presented the final conclusions, which include 
the implications of the theoretical model and suggestions for future investigation. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
In this chapter it is presented a literature review about the market failures and the firm 
behavior linked to tobacco industry. It is also analyzed the effectiveness of tobacco 
control policies. Regarding the suggestion for a new regulation on tobacco market it is 
defined the price cap method, its application disadvantages and advantages against other 
types of regulation.   
 
2.1.  Tobacco Industry  
The main topics in the economic literature about tobacco industry mainly discuss the 
demand for tobacco products (price-elasticity, income-elasticity, etc.) and the 
effectiveness of taxation (or other types of regulation) on variables such as 
consumption, price and welfare. Additionally, the literature also identifies, measures 
and analyzes the failures of tobacco market.  
Therefore, a market failure that is intensively debated in the tobacco literature is the 
presence of market power and monopolistic behavior that could lead to abnormal profits 
on tobacco industry. Market power is defined as the ability of a firm to charge prices 
above marginal cost, affecting the quantity produced in the market and increasing their 
profits (Cabral 2000). 
This capacity to set prices may be the result of the existence of high market 
concentration on tobacco industry. Thus, there are many works that studied the exercise 
of monopoly power, the majority applied on the U.S.A and using data on taxes 
(Sumner, 1981; Sullivan, 1985; Ashenfelter and Sullivan, 1987; Keeler et al, 1996). 
Although the perfect competition was rejected, it was considered that the effect of 
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monopoly power as a cause for price variation was small compared with the tax rates or 
other costs. Sumner (1981) used data on annual tax rates and prices between 1954 and 
1978, for 47 states and the District of Columbia, rejecting perfect competition but do 
not supporting the existence of cartel operations on tobacco industry. However, 
Sumner's work was subject to criticisms about the assumptions on demand. Then, in 
1985, Sullivan (1985) try to establish the absence of a cartel using weaker assumptions 
in order to avoid those criticisms. He used data from 45 states between 1955 and 1982 
and his results “(…) point to at least a moderately high level of competition and, in 
particular, allow for the rejection of the perfect cartel model”. In turn, Ashenfelter and 
Sullivan (1987) used non parametric tests of the monopoly model on the same data as 
Sullivan (1985) to show that “(…) monopoly hypothesis and other simple models that 
do not embody at least a moderate amount of competition serve as poor predictors of 
the effects of excise tax changes on cigarette prices, sales, and revenues.”, identical 
conclusions to Sullivan (1985). Contrarily to the previous works, they found that 
“(…)excise tax increases do not consistently act to increase prices and decrease 
sales(…)” what calls for other hypothesis for firm behavior. Keeler et al. (1996) found 
that cigarette manufacturers practice price discrimination by state, “(…) though the 
effect is not large relative to the final retail price.” Additionally, the authors conclude 
that the effects of each state taxes are more than proportional: “(…) a 1 cent state tax 
increase results in a price increase of 1.11cents (…)” (contrarily to Ashenfelter and 
Sullivan (1987) where tax increases were not consistent with price increases). Moreover 
they find that the effects of local anti-smoking regulations may be offset by sellers 
through a retail price reduction to deal with possible demand declines. 
Later, other authors began to study the case of bilateral market power between 
cigarettes manufacturers and leaf tobacco growers. It is argued that exist significant 
exertion of monopsony power on leaf tobacco market by the cigarettes manufacturers 
but there is no evidence of the monopoly power exercised by those manufacturers on 
consumer market (Raper et al, 2000). Following the work of Raper et al. (2000), Raper 
and Love (2007) found more specific conclusions applying non-parametric tests 
showing that cigarettes manufacturers not only have monopsony power but also 
monopoly power, although small. Moreover the monopsony power is more evident in 
domestic demand than imported leaf tobacco. 
 
 
  6 
  
Marketing quota and price support programs were commonly applied under the USA 
farm policy until 2004 which was the case of tobacco (Dohlman 2010). Thus, there are 
several works studying that issue, especially about the North Carolina flue-cured 
tobacco, a type of leaf tobacco whose production is centered in this region and that 
represents large part of the tobacco production in USA. The quota may be seen as an 
input for tobacco production whose supply is perfectly inelastic (Rucker et al. 1995).  
Thus, under supply controls and increases on marginal costs “(...) quota owners 
unambiguously lose (…)” while producers2 gain if marginal costs diverge with higher 
input. In that case the total rent declines because quota owners lose more than the 
producers gain (Babcock and Foster 1992). The market supply elasticity for flue-cured 
tobacco was estimated by Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) in 7.0 higher than estimated by 
other authors namely Rucker et al. (1995). Rucker et al. (1995) developed marginal cost 
functions for the North Carolina counties to estimate the supply response of tobacco 
production from an elimination of inter-county restrictions on the quota transfer and 
estimated an aggregate elasticity of 4. The end of the federal tobacco program resulted 
in a tobacco production increase (Brown et al. 2007). 
With concern to the firm behavior in markets with addiction considering that the 
demand is linked over time Showalter (1999) came up with some interesting results. He 
analyzes a theoretical model for monopolistic behavior in the presence of myopic
3
 
consumers and shows that future variables will be correlated with current variables, 
which means that in a market controlled by a monopolist, the anticipated events can 
affect present consumption due to producer’s rational optimization. So, “(…) the 
empirically established correlation between future consumption and current 
consumption found in the rational addiction literature could be the sole result of 
forward-looking producer behavior (…)”. Contrary to the monopoly model, the author 
also found that the monopolist might optimally set prices at or even below his marginal 
cost for some period of time which could be the result of his responses to changes about 
future events. He also studies the effects of the federal excise tax increase that occurred 
                                                        
2
 Quota owners are the holders of the marketable production quotas and producers pay a quota rate to 
quota owners for the right to produce a unit of production.  
3
 The difference between rational and myopic consumers is in incorporate (or not) the future at the 
moment of taking decisions. Rational consumers do not ignore the future.  For myopic consumers the 
optimization problem only takes into account the present and the past, but not the future. 
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in 1983, using data on cigarettes consumption finding that unexpectedly both models 
(myopic and rational) of consumer demand give nearly the same predictions for per 
capita consumption and total tax revenues. However the models overestimate actual 
consumption causing an overestimation of tax revenue increase about 15-20% per year. 
Regarding price prediction this problem also appears which suggests that supply effects 
should be considered, i.e., the firms’ response to tax changes may be more important 
than the simple distinction between rational and myopic consumers.  
As tobacco is a good with particularly characteristics, since it has addictive properties 
and potential negative effects on smokers and others health, another type of market 
failure discussed in literature is the externalities in tobacco market. The health effects 
are frequently studied on health reports with statistics about deaths and other 
information published at an international/European level or published by national 
entities.    
Therefore the externalities theme is usually studied in order to explain why regulation is 
needed. There are three main arguments to consider the tobacco externalities as a 
market failure: externality that young smokers impose upon themselves (consequences 
on their future adult persons and influences on adult behavior), irrationality in tobacco 
consumption and peer effects (Laux 2000). With regard to the peer effects, they are 
particularly important in the study of the youth smoking. Powell et al. (2005)
4
 study the 
direct and indirect effects (via the peer effects) of prices and anti-smoking regulations 
estimating an economic model more extensive than the standard model for youth 
smoking determinants. Therefore the authors integrated simultaneously the taxes, other 
tobacco control policies and peer effects to conclude that peer effects are very important 
on youth smoking decisions: “(…) moving a high-school student from a school where 
no children smoke to a school where one quarter of the youths smoke is found to 
increase the probability that the youth smokes by about 14.5 percentage point.” 
Additionally, higher cigarette prices and smoking restrictions influence not only the 
                                                        
4
 To estimate the model, Powell, L. M., J. A. Tauras and H. Ross (2005), "The importance of peer effects, 
cigarette prices and tobacco control policies for youth smoking behavior", Journal of Health Economics, 
Vol.24nº 5, pp.950-968. used Audits & Surveys (A&S) 1996 survey data of high school students in the 
United States from “The Study of Smoking and Tobacco Use Among Young People”. The peer effects 
are measure trough the calculus of the school smoking prevalence. “That is, for each student the 
prevalence of school-based peer smoking is the average prevalence of smoking among all other 
respondents at their school.” 
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youth smoking decisions and number of cigarettes smoked, but also the way they are 
acquired: with higher prices, teens are less likely to become regular smokers but have 
incentives to borrow cigarettes on “social market” (Katzman et al. 2007)5. Thus, the 
current tobacco control policies are ineffective in reaching this group of teens who 
obtain tobacco trough the social market (Powell et al. 2005) 
The features of tobacco market described and studied above justify tobacco regulation 
but the literature also investigates the impact and effectiveness of tobacco control 
policies. Nations across the world had hardly tried to “fight” tobacco consumption 
through various tobacco control policies (implemented for more than 20 years). 
Although the success of the measures and policies is mixed, the price controls seemed 
to be the most effective measure (Gruber, 2002; Goel and Nelson, 2006). The last 20 
years are characterized by a sequence of mergers, acquisitions and privatizations that 
led to the creation of the largest transnational tobacco companies in terms of volume 
and market share, as it is now (Bialous and Peeters 2012).  
The new research published in the last few years focus on different policies that could 
be adopted on tobacco market, in particularly on the instruments that affect the 
producers’ profits. It is in this context that it is the major contribution of  Gilmore et al. 
(2010) to the topic. These authors suggest the application of a price cap regulation 
imposed to the tobacco producers in the United Kingdom, without changing retail price. 
They argue that price cap would control the excessive margins of producers, increase 
government revenue (with the transfer of the excess profits through tax increases) and 
also promote benefits to public health (“(…)preventing downtrading to cheaper 
products and controlling unwanted industry practices such as cigarette smuggling, 
price fixing and marketing to the young”).  
Following the previous work, Branston and Gilmore (2014) show that the application of  
the price cap regulation imposed to tobacco producers is feasible. They determine the 
current profits of the tobacco companies in the United Kingdom, how much such profits 
could be reduced by the implementation of the price cap regulation and consequently 
                                                        
5
 The authors used data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (USA). This survey distinguishes the 
youths who actually buy cigarettes of those who borrow. 
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the government revenue increase. The authors use the profits range
6
 evidenced by 
several European transnational companies operating in more competitive markets (e.g.: 
L’Oreal, Unilever, Danone, Nestle, Heineken, Carlsberg, etc.) and analyze  two 
scenarios called “conservative scenario”, which allowed companies to make returns of 
20%, and “optimistic scenario” allowing returns of 12%. The results show that 
“Applying a system of price-cap regulation in the UK would raise around £500 million 
per annum (US $ 750 million).”  
It is very important to understand the relation between the market growth (in value, not 
volume) and the profits to comprehend the industry behavior and consequently planning 
effective tobacco control policies. Global consumption is declining but industry’ profits 
continue to increase, which can largely be explained by the industry “(…) phenomenal 
pricing power which is now fundamental to its future.” (Gilmore 2012).  There have 
been numerous efforts to align the public health objectives with tobacco companies’ 
actions. Callard and Collishaw (2013) summarize six proposals to do so including ”(..) 
proposals for new structures through which tobacco products would be supplied, profit 
controls on the industry and legislated market outcomes” (the profit control suggestion 
represents the work of Gilmore et al. (2010)). Additionally the different political points 
of view present on society can be seen as a barrier to the establishment of an optimal 
policy in the tobacco industry, especially supply-side interventions (Callard and 
Collishaw 2013). The works made by Gilmore (2012) and Callard and Collishaw (2013) 
reinforces the need to integrate new methods of regulation on tobacco market and both 
refer the price cap regulation suggested by Gilmore et al. (2010). 
 
2.2.  Price cap Regulation 
The literature discusses the application of price cap regulation since it was developed in 
the 1980’s by Stephen Littlechild, United Kingdom Treasury economist (Armstrong et 
al. 1994) and applied to British Telecom. Over the years several studies have been 
published about price cap regulation and this instrument has been largely applied by 
many countries in several sectors (energy, telecommunications, transports, etc.)  
                                                        
6
 The profitability is measured using EBITA (Earnings before interest, taxation and amortization) margin.  
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Regulators should regulate firms with market power to avoid the abusive prices that 
could be set but at the same time the firm’s efficiency should also be promoted. The 
price cap regulation faces these problems (Cowan 2002). Price cap regulation involves 
fixing a maximum price during a regulatory period, under which the regulated firm can 
freely set prices. At the end of each regulatory period the regulator adjusts the 
maximum price considering inflation, efficiency gains and other exogenous costs. The 
factor representing the efficiency gains is deducted from the price charged in the 
previous period to regulation. Thus, the regulated firm has incentives to invest on cost 
reduction and the consumers also benefit from the productivity increases. Moreover, the 
higher regulatory periods, the higher costs saving incentives are but consumers only 
later benefit from the efficiency gains. Therefore, price cap regulation has been popular 
and seems to succeed in its main objective that is to create cost efficiency incentives 
(Cowan, 2002; Currier, 2007; Sappington and Weisman, 2010). 
Usually, the main problem frequently discussed is the difficult on setting the factor that 
represents the expected productivity increases, the so called X factor. The value of the 
X factor is usually defined taking into account the comparison between the rate of 
growth of the firm’s input prices and the other firm’s long-term productivity 
performance in the industry,  the market competitive forces, negotiations between the 
firms and the regulator and the regulator’s general perspective on the firm efficiency. 
The definition of the X factor should also consider the consumer’s defense, the auto-
financing ability and the technological dynamism (Pires and Piccinini, 1998; Currier 
and Jackson, 2008). Regarding the technological investments, there still remains the 
challenge to promote long term investment. Therefore price cap regulation “(…) may be 
more appropriate for industries without substantial investment requirements where 
there is excess capacity than for expanding industries with large investment plans.” 
(Cowan 2002). Also, sectors with greater technological dynamism (as 
telecommunications sector for instance) present higher X values than those who 
technological innovation is slower (Pires and Piccinini 1998). Additionally, if the X 
factor is set too high, the firm may not cover its costs. On the other hand, if it is set too 
low the firm could earn abnormal profits and prices still remain excessive. Since the 
productivity evolution is so important there are different methods to define the X factor 
such as historical analysis and benchmarking. However “If the regulator uses the past 
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performance of the firm, such as profitability, as a guide to setting the X factor then 
management incentives will be undermined” (Treasury 1999).  
The plan of price cap regulation includes the definition of the time between the 
regulation will operate until it is reviewed. The gap between reviews is known as the 
regulatory lag. This issue is subject to some considerations. A short plan “can help to 
ensure that prices do not diverge too far from underlying production costs and that 
realized earnings do not depart too far from the target level (…)” and also could 
discouraged firms to innovate and reduce production costs. “In particular, if the X 
factor is re-set frequently to pass on to consumers in the form of lower prices any cost 
reductions that the regulated firm has achieved, then the firm’s incentive to secure these 
cost reductions will be limited” (Sappington and Weisman 2010). 
Additionally, on dynamic regulatory relationships can arise the ratchet effect. 
According to this effect the regulated firm has incentives to show less efficient in order 
to induce higher caps (Resende 1997). “In a price cap setting it might happen that cost 
savings (or at least a fraction of them) generated in excess of those anticipated by the 
regulator are clawed back to consumers through lower prices”. Therefore, the ratchet 
effect can origin cycles on cost cutting activity: “(...) firms’ cost cutting activity tends to 
increase in the early phase of the regulatory cycle, while it weakens as the price review 
approaches.” (Bottasso and Conti, 2009). Such effect can be the result of the 
regulator’s lack of commitment to a long term contract. “If the firm by its past 
performance reveals efficiency, the regulator adjusts the contract to reduce future 
costly rent given to the firm.” Thus, unless the regulator provides strong incentives to 
regulated firms, at the beginning of the contract, the efficient firms will tend to mimic 
the inefficient ones to ensure future rent (Dalen, 1995; Bottasso and Conti, 2009). 
However, the regulator can use efficiency-improving investment to prevent the ratchet 
effect: “if inefficient firms over time catch up with efficient firms due to efficiency-
improving investment, future information rent will decrease, thereby reducing efficient 
firms’ incentives to pool with inefficient firms” (Dalen, 1995) 
Another disadvantage is the lack of interest to produce with quality levels: “(…) it is not 
clear that regulators can appropriately trade-off price against quality”. Price cap 
regulation promotes the cost efficiency but this effort to reduce costs could have an 
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adverse effect on the quality of the good or service produced (Cowan 2002). Because 
ensure the quality may be expensive, the cost incentives under the price cap regulation 
may lead to a delivered service quality degradation (Currier and Jackson 2008). Limited 
by the regulator price, the firm will only invest in quality when the demand increases 
(and therefore revenue increases) exceed the costs of this investment (Ghirardi 2000). 
Thus, price caps should be somehow tied up to quality (Brennan 1989). However, there 
is little evidence that under price cap regulation exists quality degradation since the 
regulators frequently monitor service quality measures, public the results and 
consequently threaten with lower prices on next review (Banerjee, 2003; Cowan, 2002) 
As said before price cap regulation is usually applied in utilities. A very common 
scenario in utilities is the existence of partial separation. This separation is a vertical 
separation which means that the firm is separated in terms of activities practiced and 
some specific activities are subject to regulation and others are not. In some sectors, the 
regulated activity is downstream and the upstream activity is deregulated. Through a 
theoretical model, Reitzes (2007) studied the application of a price cap regulation in that 
case. The author shows that the imposition of downstream price cap jointly with an 
appropriate profit sharing rate (between the regulated downstream firm and consumers) 
can eliminate the market power exercised by the upstream firm, since it can be induced 
to marginalize the price. Thus, the regulator can indirectly constrain the market power 
exercised by the upstream affiliate through the regulation system applied to downstream 
affiliate. However, price cap regulation applied downstream is less effective if the 
upstream rivals also behave strategically.  
The comparison between price cap regulation and other forms of regulation is also 
discussed in microeconomic literature. Despite the problems and given the advantages 
of this method the authors argued that price cap regulation is superior to other types of 
regulation, namely rate of return regulation (Clemenz, 1991; Liston, 1993; Pires and 
Piccinini, 1998; Vogelsang, 2002; Currier and Jackson, 2008; Sappington and 
Weisman, 2010). Price cap regulation has been so popular since it provides incentives 
for cost reduction and promotes an efficient pricing (Vogelsang, 2002). Hence, price 
cap regulation is more effective than rate-of-return regulation regarding the creation of 
incentives to promote efficiency since under rate-of-return regulation the firms have no 
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incentives to cost efficiency (Currier and Jackson, 2008). Additionally, Clemenz (1991) 
sought to study the case where the regulator is not able to observe investment 
expenditures of a firm who wants to reduce its’ production costs and conclude that price 
cap method “(…)not only provide stronger incentives for investments in cost reduction 
than rate-of-return regulation, but that it is also capable of achieving a higher social 
welfare”.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Portuguese Tobacco Industry – Market Structure 
Characterization 
 
This section describes the tobacco industry structure in Portugal mostly using the data 
from SABI
7
 (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System). SABI is a database that contains 
information about companies in Spain and Portugal that goes back to 12 years ago.  
On the worldwide stage there are four major transnational companies operating on all 
phases of the value chain of tobacco industry (excluding Chinese National Tobacco 
Corporation, a state-owned tobacco company, that owns about 98% of the Chinese 
market): the Phillip Morris International (PMI), the British American Tobacco, the 
Japan Tobacco International and Imperial Tobacco, in descending order by size on 
volume production (Gilmore et al. 2010). Moreover PMI is the market leader in 
cigarettes production and the most profitable company in the world, in this sector. 
Additionally, around the world there are more than 500 factories that jointly produce 6 
trillion cigarettes. In Portugal the cigarette production was 25 billion pieces in 2010 
(Eriksen et al. 2012). 
It is important to note that production and distribution are two distinct markets. 
Therefore, to find how many companies operate on each market the companies where 
search by CAE (Economic Activity Classification), which is different among these 
markets, in Portugal. The data found helped to describe the tobacco industry and will 
help to define some hypothesis for model’s construction. 
PMI is the only company of the “Big-Four” group that has a subsidiary in Portugal, 
called “A Tabaqueira”. “A Tabaqueira” is one of the largest companies in the country 
                                                        
7
 SABI was accessed on February of 2014 to explore Portuguese tobacco industry specifically the number 
of firms, operational results and market shares. It was used the most recent data which refer to the year of 
2012. 
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and the largest tobacco company in Portugal. British American Tobacco is represented 
as one of the shareholders of the smallest tobacco company (“SUT- Sociedade 
Unificada de Tabacos Lda.”) operating on production market so has almost no impact 
in Portugal. 
On tobacco production
8
 the market is highly concentrated with only five companies 
operating on this market: 
 “Tabaqueira - Empresa Industrial de Tabacos, S.A.” 
 “Empresa Madeirense de Tabacos S.A.” 
 “Fábrica de Tabaco Micaelense S.A.” 
  “STG Portugal, S.A.” 
 “SUT- Sociedade Unificada de Tabacos Lda.” 
Of this five only two have higher significance: “Tabaqueira - Empresa Industrial de 
Tabacos, S.A.” and “Empresa Madeirense de Tabacos S.A.” 
It is noteworthy that it is the PMI subsidiary - “Tabaqueira- Empresa Industrial de 
Tabacos, S.A”- that have the greatest market share holding about 45% of the production 
market. Additionally, “Fábrica de Tabaco Micaelense S.A.” holds about 23% of 
production market but is also classified with another CAE
9
. Thus, this company 
operates not only on production market but also on retail market. Therefore 23% is not 
an exact value for tobacco production market share.  
The distribution market
10
 is considered as the wholesale market and not the final place 
where tobacco is sold (retailers on specialized stores
11
). The PMI subsidiary (which 
holds the largest market share on production market) has a “sister company” -
“Tabaqueira II, S.A” that operates on the distribution market. On distribution market it 
is the PMI subsidiary that has greater expression in relation to other companies, holding 
about 11% of the market. The remaining firms have all market shares below 5% and 
more than 50% of the remaining firms have market shares below 1%.  
                                                        
8
 Production market is classified with CAE 12000. 
9
 That company is also classified with CAE 47260, which refers to tobacco retailers on specialized stores. 
10
 The distribution market is classified with CAE 46350. 
11
 The retail market is classified with CAE 47260. 
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The main difference between Portuguese tobacco production market and Portuguese 
tobacco distribution market is the number of firms. The production market is very 
concentrated while on distribution market there are over two hundred companies. In 
addition, many of these distributors have more than one CAE which means that they 
operate and compete on other markets. Thus, the total revenue does not come from only 
tobacco distribution activity. This distinction allows underline even more the position of 
the PMI subsidiary. 
Regarding the tobacco price, it is know that tobacco is subject to taxation. Therefore, 
the final price includes the taxes imposed by the Portuguese government. Thus, at the 
packing process and distribution preparation stages, the final price is already 
established. In Portugal, about 83% of the retail price is composed by taxes (included 
the value-added-tax (VAT) and other tobacco taxes) (Nunes 2014), having generated, in 
2013, a tax revenue around 1312, 9 € million (DGAIEC 2014). 
The “Imposto sobre o Tabaco (IT)” is part of the excise taxes group and is applied to the 
selling price of the cigarette packs.
12
 According to the “Autoridade Tributária e 
Aduaneira (AT) the IT rates currently in force for cigarettes are 17% for the Ad Valorem 
element and 87,33€ (per 1000 cigarettes) for the specific element.13 Additionally 
cigarettes are subject to a minimum excise duty that corresponds to 104% of the tax 
resultant from the application of the tax rate charged to the most popular price category 
(“Código dos Impostos Especiais de Consumo (Decreto-Lei n.º 73/2010, de 21/06 - 
redacção dada pela Lei n.º 83-C/2013, de 31/12)) ”.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12
 Other types of tobacco as the cigars, cigarillos, fine cut tobacco etc. are also subject to taxation and 
there have been an increase on taxation levels among those types.  
13
 The specific element corresponds to a fixed value per number of pieces (in tobacco case per 1000 
cigarettes) while the Ad-valorem element corresponds to a fraction of the value taxed, expressed as a 
percentage.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Price Cap Regulation - The Model 
 
This chapter describes the model constructed to study the effects of price cap regulation 
imposed to an upstream firm that sells the product to two downstream firms 
Furthermore, the analysis of price cap regulation is also developed considering other 
aspects of the market. Then, the strategic behavior of the upstream firm and the 
asymmetric costs between downstream firms is also studied. 
The structure of the market considered in the model is the following. At the upstream 
level (the production market) there is a monopolist that sells the product to two 
downstream firms (the distribution market).
14
 Both distributors have to buy from the 
monopolist. Hence, we assume that there is no alternative supplier of the product.
15
 The 
distributors sell the product to the final consumers.
16
 
The upstream firm is subject to price cap regulation. This means that at each period the 
regulator sets the maximum price allowed for this firm. We consider that initially the 
regulator announces that it will imposed a price cap on the second period which 
depends on the price observed in the first period and also on the expected rate of 
inflation and efficiency gains, as explained in Chapter 2.  
Hence the model is developed as a sequential game in order to have a better 
understanding of the application of the price cap mechanism. At the first stage, firms 
decide the quantities (as a monopolist in the case of the upstream firm and as Cournot 
followers in the case of the downstream firms), without any price cap constraint. Then, 
prices and profits of the first stage are set. At the second stage, firms compete again, and 
                                                        
14
 As described in Chapter 3, the Portuguese tobacco industry is characterized by a highly concentrated 
production market that we represented by a monopoly. At the distribution market there is competition that 
we represented by the duopoly in which one of the firms is vertically integrated with the producer 
(“sisters companies”). 
15
 We do not consider the possibility of imports, for instance. 
16
 In the circuit there are also the retailers between the wholesale distributors and the final consumers. 
However the retailers are not relevant to the model.  
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choose the second period quantities subject to a price constraint price. Then, new prices 
and profits are set. 
The model is presented in four different versions. In the first version (the basic model) 
firms are myopic, that is, when deciding the quantities of each period firms only take 
into account the profit of that period. Also, in the first version of the model the 
downstream firms have the same cost function. In the second version it is assumed that 
the upstream firm decides strategically. This means that the upstream firm takes into 
account the regulatory process of setting the second period’s price cap. Therefore the 
upstream firm chooses the quantity that maximizes the sum of period 1 and period 2 
profits. As in the first version it is assumed that the downstream firms have the same 
costs. The third version considers that firms are myopic and that the downstream firms 
have different cost functions. Finally, in the fourth version of the model it is assumed 
that the upstream firm behaves strategically and that the downstream firms have 
different costs. 
Furthermore it will be considered perfect and complete information. Then, the model is 
solved by backward induction.  
4.1.  Hypothesis and variables  
The market structure is represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Market Structure 
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On the production market the monopolist (firm M) sells the product at price r, to the 
distributors (firms DA and DB). The distributors sell the product to final consumers.  
The demand faced by DA and DB is assumed to be a linear function express as
bQaP  , with BA qqQ   where Q, qA and qB represent the total and individual 
quantities (for firms DA and DB), respectively, and a and b are positive parameters. 
Additionally it is also assumed that demand function is steady (that is, there are no 
changes from a period to another) and that the discount rate of future profits is 1, which 
means that the time value of money is ignored.  
Regarding the firms costs we consider that the monopolist has a constant marginal cost 
given by c, with ac  , and fixed costs represented by F, with 0F  .  The downstream 
firms’ costs only depend on the wholesale price. For simplicity all other downstream 
costs are normalized to zero. 
Then, the profit functions are the following: 
Firm M: FQ*)cr( M   (1) 
Firm DA: AA q*)rP(   (2) 
Firm DB: BB q*)rP(   (3) 
       
Notice that for each period, M first decides Q and then DA and DB choose qA and qB, 
respectively. Then, the results of period 1 and 2 are represented as follows: Q1 and Q2 
represent the total quantity in period 1 and 2, respectively; q1A, q1B, q2A and q2B, 
represent the individual quantities for firms DA and DB in period 1 and period 2, 
respectively; r1 and r2 represent the wholesale prices of period 1 and period 2, 
respectively, P1 and P2 represent the final prices of period 1 and period 2 respectively; 
finally πM1, π1A, π1B, πM2, π2A and π2B represent the firms’ profits (for firm M, firm DA 
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and firm DB) in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The payoffs of the firms are given by the 
sum of period’s 1 and period’s 2 profits. 
4.2.  Solving the problem - PCR application 
Using backward induction there are four steps to solve the model and find the 
equilibria: 
 1st Step: DA and DB decide q2A and q2B (that depend on r2). Summing q2A 
and q2B it is found the demand faced by M on second period. 
 
 2nd Step: M chooses Q2, subject to the price constraint. The price 
constraint depends on r1, which is a first period variable. 
 
 3rd Step: DA and DB decide q1A and q1B (that depend on r1). Summing q1A 
and q1B it is found the demand faced by M on first period. 
 
 4th Step: M chooses Q1; 
The price restriction on the first stage is represented by the following expression:
-r =r 1 2 , where r1 is the price observed on prior period to regulation and   symbolizes 
the net effect of the inflation, expected efficiency gains and exogenous costs. Since the 
objective of price cap regulation is to reduce the price charged it is assumed that 0> . 
The aim of building a model with two periods is not only to evaluate the effect of price 
cap regulation but also to be able to consider that the monopolist could act strategically. 
Therefore, on period 1 the monopolist can take into account that it will be subject to a 
price restriction on the following period.  
Adding the fact that will be considered the existence of asymmetric costs between the 
wholesale distributors, we create four scenarios (or four versions of the model) that will 
help to study each relevant issue inherent to the industry: 
 Scenario 1: Symmetric Costs between the Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Myopic Monopolist;  
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 Scenario 2: Symmetric Costs between the Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Strategic Monopolist; 
 
 Scenario 3: Asymmetric Costs between the Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Myopic Monopolist; 
 
 Scenario 4: Asymmetric Costs between the Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Strategic Monopolist; 
 
We first describe the first scenario in detail and then highlight the differences for the 
remaining scenarios.
17
 
4.2.1. Scenario 1: Symmetric Costs between Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Myopic Monopolist 
 
 1st Step - DA and DB decide q2A and q2B:  
Demand faced by DA and DB is assumed as a linear function represented by
22 bQaP  , with 2B2A2 qqQ  . The total costs of the companies operating on 
distribution market are assumed as: 
ii
r*qTC  , with i = A, B. Hence the total costs of 
DA in period 2 is A22A q*rTC   and the profits are expressed by the following 
expression:  
 A22A22A2 *q-r*q = Pπ  (4) 
From the first order condition of the profit maximization problem in order to q2A it is 
found the DA’s best response function
18
:  
                                                        
17 To solve the mathematical problems it was used the program Scientific Workplace 5.5. 
18
 The second order condition of the profit maximization problem is verified. In the following problems 
this condition is also verified, and therefore we will not mention it. 
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b2
rbqa
q
2B2
A2

  
(5) 
As DA and DB are identical companies the result is symmetric and DB’s best response 
function is given by: 
 
b2
rbqa
q
2A2
B2

  
(6) 
The individual quantities that maximize the profits are obtained solving the system with 
the two best response functions. The solutions are equal among both companies and 
expressed by:  
 
)r-(a
3b
1
 =q qq 2 2
2B2A
  
(7) 
The total amount produced at the second stage is:  
 
) (a-r
b3
2
  = + q= qQ 2B2A2 2   
(8) 
And price r2 charged in the market is: 
 
22 bQ
2
3
-a=r  
(9) 
 
 2nd Step - M chooses Q2 subject to the price cap constraint 
The equation (8) defined in the previous step represents the demand function of period 2 
that it is relevant for the monopolist decision.  
Then firm’s M problem is the following: 
Max Q2 )cQ+(F-Q*r = 222 M2π  
s.t.  -r  r 12   
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The Lagrangean function is given by: 
L= )rbQ
2
3
a()cQF()bQ
2
3
a(Q 1222*2   
Remember that parameter   denotes the net effect of the inflation, expected efficiency 
gains and exogenous costs and 0> . From the first order conditions it is found the 
quantity produced by M on second period:  
 
)2r-2+(2a
3b
1
=Q 12   
(10) 
Notice that Q2 depends on the wholesale price of period 1 (r1).  
 
 3rd Step - DA and DB decide q1A and q1B  
In this step it is applied a similar reasoning of the first step but applied to the first period 
decisions.  
Therefore, the demand faced by DA and DB is 11 bQa- = P , with 1B1A1 q + q = Q . The total 
costs of DA are 1A1A q*r TC   and the profit expression is given by: 
  q*r- q*P= π 1A11A11A  (11) 
The DA’s and DB’s best response functions are:  
 
2b
 r- bq-a
= q
11B
1A  
(12) 
 
2b
 r- bq-a
= q
11A
1B  
(13) 
Again, the individual quantities that maximize the profits of the firms DA and DB are 
equal and expressed by:  
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)r-(a
3b
1
 =q=q=q 111B1A  
(14) 
The total quantity is given by:  
 
)r-(a
3b
2
 =Q 1 1  
(15) 
And the price r1 expression is: 
 
11 bQ
2
3
-a=r  
(16) 
 
 4th Step - M chooses Q1 
At the fourth step the monopolist cost function is 11M Qc*F+ = TC  and the profit 
expression is ). -(F+cQ*Q = rπ 1111M   
The inverse demand function faced by the monopolist was determined in the previous 
step and is given by equation (16). Note that here the profit maximization problem of 
the monopolist does not have any price constraint. Then, the first order condition of this 
problem leads to a total quantity produced by M of: 
 
c)(a-
b3
1
=Q 1  
(17) 
In order to obtain the equilibrium values for all the other quantities and prices we 
substitute the value of Q1 into the previous expressions. The equilibrium values are the 
following: 
 First period 
Total quantity: )ca(
b3
1
Q1   
Individual quantities: )ca(
b6
1
qq B1A1   
Prices: c
2
1
a
2
1
r1   and c
3
1
a
3
2
P1   
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Firm M profits: 6Fb)-c²2ac-²a(
b6
1
1M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)ca(
b36
1
B1A1   
 Second period 
Total quantity: )2ca(
b3
1
Q2   
Individual quantities: )2ca(
b6
1
qq B2A2   
Prices:  c
2
1
a
2
1
r2  and 
3
2
c
3
1
a
3
2
P2  
Firm M profits: 6Fb)-²4-c²2ac-²a(
b6
1
2M    
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)2ca(
b36
1
B2A2   
 
4.2.2. Scenario 2: Symmetric Costs between Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Strategic Monopolist 
On scenario 2 it is the monopolist behavior that differs from the first scenario, which 
means that the monopolist chooses the quantities of period 1 and 2 that maximize the 
sum of the profits in period 1 and 2, given by: 
 )-(F+cQ*Q) + r-(F+cQ*Q  = rΠ 222111M  (18) 
As on previous scenario, firms DA and DB  have identical costs. Thus, at the first step 
firms DA and DB choose q2A and q2B that maximize their individual profits. Then, we 
reach the same results as in scenario 1 given by the equations (7) and (8). 
At the second step, firm M chooses Q2 maximizing M  subject to the price cap 
constraint and considering the inverse demand function derived on previous step 
expressed by equation (9). Then, the firm M maximization problem is the following: 
Max Q2  )cQ(F+-Q*r + )cQ(F+-Q*r =  222111M  
s.t.  -r  r 12  
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The Lagrange function is: 
L = )rbQ
2
3
a()cQF()bQ
2
3
a(Q)cQF(Q*r 1222*2111   
From the first order conditions we obtained the Q2 that maximizes firm’s M profit that 
is also the same that on first scenario and given by the equation (10). 
Then, at the third step firms DA and DB choose the first period quantities, in the same 
way as in the first scenario. The individual quantities that maximize the profits are equal 
for the firms and given by equation (14). Hence the total quantity is expressed by 
equation (15). 
At the fourth step firm M chooses Q1 in order to maximize M . On this maximization 
problem M have to consider the inverse demand functions derived on the previous steps 
and the Q2 found on second step through the Lagrangean first order conditions, 
(expression that depends on r1 which in turns depends on Q1)    
Then, the firm M problem on first period is the following: 
Max Q1  )cQ(F+-Q*r + )cQ(F+-Q*r =  222111M  
with 11 bQ
2
3
-a=r ,  22 bQ
2
3
ar   and )r22a2(
b3
1
Q 12   
Thus, the equilibrium quantity is δ)c-(a-
b3
1
=Q 1 . 
Notice that the parameter δ, which belong to the price constraint applied on second 
period, has an impact on the equilibrium quantity of the first period. 
The equilibrium quantities and prices are now obtained by backward substitution and 
are given by: 
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 First Period 
Total quantity: )ca(
b3
1
Q1   
Individual quantities: )ca(
b6
1
qq B1A1   
Prices: 
2
1
c
2
1
a
2
1
r1  and 
3
1
c
3
1
a
3
2
P1  
Firm M profits: 6Fb)-²-c²2ac-²a(
b3
1
M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)ac(
b36
1
B1A1   
 Second Period 
Total quantity: )ca(
b3
1
Q2   , 
Individual quantities: )ca(
b6
1
qq B2A2   
Prices: 
2
1
c
2
1
a
2
1
r2  and 
3
1
c
3
1
a
3
2
P2  
Firm M profits: 6Fb)-²-c²2ac-²a(
b3
1
M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)ca(
b36
1
B2A2   
 
4.2.3. Scenario 3: Asymmetric Costs between Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Myopic Monopolist 
 
Here it is studied the effects of asymmetric costs between DA and DB. Without loss of 
generality it is assumed that DA is the more efficient company only bearing the 
wholesale price as unitary cost. Differently, besides the wholesale price, firm DB has an 
additional unitary cost of e, with 0e  . Then DB’s cost function is given by
2B2B q*e)+(r = TC . This function indicates that the marginal cost of producing one unit 
of output is higher, on the value e, for DB than for DA. Thus, the profit function of DB is  
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 B222B2 q*)erP(   (19) 
Considering again the Cournot behavior for each firm the DA’s best response function is 
again given by equation (5).  
Contrary to what happens to firm DA, the best response function of firm DB is different 
from the previous scenarios. By maximizing π2B in order to q2B it is found the DB’s best 
response function:  
 
.
2b
 e-r- bq-a
 = q
22A
2B  
(20) 
Solving the system with both best response functions we obtain the individual quantities 
produced by DA and DB:  
 
)r-e(a
3b
1
 = q 22A   
(21) 
 
)r-2e-(a
3b
1
= q 22B  
(22) 
Thus, the total quantity is:  
 
 )2r-e-(2a
3b
1
 = q+q = Q 22B2A2  
(23) 
And the derived inverse demand faced by M is now expressed by: 
 
22 bQ
2
3
-e
2
1
-a = r  
(24) 
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Following the second step of first scenario the maximization problem of firm M is: 
Max Q2 )cQ+(F-Q*r = 222 M2π  
s.t.  -r  r 12  
The Lagrangean function is now given by: 
L= )rbQ
2
3
e
2
1
a()cQF()bQ
2
3
e
2
1
a(Q 1222*2   
From the first order conditions it is found the total quantity produced M on second 
period:  
 
e).-2r-2+(2a
3b
1
=Q 12   
(25) 
Notice that, in this scenario, Q2 is influenced not only by the first period wholesale price 
(r1) and the parameter  , that denotes the price cap action (as on the other scenarios), 
but also by the constant e that reflects the cost asymmetry between downstream firms.  
Considering now the first period and using the same reasoning as in the first step, in 
third step is obtained the best response functions of firms DA and DB that are given by:  
 
2b
r- bq-a
 = q
11B
1A  
(26) 
 
2b
e-r- bq-a
 = q
11A
1B  
(27) 
Solving the system with the best response functions, the quantities that maximize the 
individual profits of DA and DB are: 
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 )r-e(a
3b
1
 = q 11A   
(28) 
 
 ).r-2e-(a
3b
1 
= q 11B  
(29) 
Thus, the total quantity produced on first scenario is given by: 
 
 )2r-e-(2a
3b
1
 = q+q = Q 11B1A1  
(30) 
And the price r1 expression is:  
 
11 bQ
2
3
-e
2
1
-a = r  
(31) 
In the fourth step firm M maximize πM1 in order to Q1, considering the price r1 defined 
by equation (31), leading to the choice of e)-2c-(2a
6b
1
=Q1 . 
The equilibrium values are obtained by backward substitution and are the following:   
 First Period 
Total quantity: )ec2a2(
b6
1
Q1   
Individual quantities: )e5c2a2(
b12
1
q A1   and )e7c2a2(
b12
1
q B1   
Prices: e
4
1
c
2
1
a
2
1
r1   and e
6
1
c
3
1
a
3
2
P1   
Firm M profits: 24Fb)-e²4ec4c²4ea-8ac-²a4(
b3
1
1M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)e5c2a2(
b144
1
A1  and ²)e7a2c2(
b144
1
B1   
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 Second Period 
Total quantity: )e4c2a2(
b6
1
Q2    
Individual quantities: )e54c2a2(
b12
1
q A2   and )e74c2a2(
b12
1
q B2   
Prices:  e
4
1
c
2
1
a
2
1
r2  and e
6
1
3
2
c
3
1
a
3
2
P2   
Firm M profits: 24Fb)-e²²16-4ecc²4ea48ac-²a4(
b24
1
2M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)e54c2a2(
b144
1
A2   and ²)e74c2a2(
b144
1
B2   
 
4.2.4. Scenario 4: Asymmetric Costs between Downstream Firms and 
Upstream Strategic Monopolist 
 
In this scenario it is studied the simultaneous existence of asymmetric costs between 
wholesalers and the monopolist strategic behavior.  
As on third scenario, firms DA and DB have asymmetric costs. Thus, at the first step 
firms DA and DB choose the second period quantities that maximize their individual 
profits. Then, we reach the same results as in scenario 3 given by equations (21) and 
(22) for individual quantities and by equation (23) for the total quantity. 
Following the second scenario, M chooses the quantities Q1 and Q2 that maximize the 
sum of the profits in period 1 and 2 ( M ), expressed by equation (18). 
Thus, at the second step, firm M chooses Q2 maximizing M  subject to the price cap 
constraint and considering the inverse demand function derived on previous step equal 
to equation (24). Then, the firm M problem is the following: 
Max Q2  )cQ(F+-Q*r + )cQ(F+-Q*r =  Π 222111M  
s.t δ-r  r 12≤  
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The Lagrange function is: 
L = )rbQ
2
3
e
2
1
a()cQF()bQ
2
3
e
2
1
a(Q)cQF(Q*r 1222*2111   
From the first order conditions is obtained the Q2 that maximizes firm’s M profits 
which is the same as in scenario 3 and given by equation (25). 
In third step firms DA and DB decide q1A and q1B, respectively. Then, we reach the same 
results as in scenario 3: equations (28) and (29). Hence the total quantity is given by 
equation (30). 
As on second scenario, at the fourth step firm M chooses Q1 in order to maximize MΠ
considering the inverse demand functions and the second period quantity that depends 
on the wholesale price charged on first period.  
Then, the firm M maximization problem on first period is the following: 
Max Q1  )cQ(F+-Q*r + )cQ(F+-Q*r =  Π 222111M  
with 11 bQ
2
3
e
2
1
-a=r ,  22 bQ
2
3
e
2
1
ar   and )er22a2(
b3
1
Q 12    
Thus, the equilibrium quantity is e)-2-2c-(2a
6b
1
=Q1  . Therefore, the equilibrium 
total quantity produced on first period depends not only on the δ parameter of the price 
constraint restriction but also on the constant e, which reflects the costs asymmetry on 
distribution market.  
By backward substitution the equilibrium values of the fourth scenario are the 
following: 
 First Period: 
Total quantity: )e2c2a2(
b6
1
Q1   
Individual quantities: )e52c2a2(
b12
1
q A1  and )e72c2a2(
b12
1
q B1   
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Prices: e
4
1
2
1
c
2
1
a
2
1
r1   and e
6
1
3
1
c
3
1
a
3
2
P1   
Firm M profits: 24Fb)-e²²4-4ecc²44ea-8ac-²a4(
b12
1
M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)e52a2c2(
b144
1
A1   and ²)e72a2c2(
b144
1
B1   
 Second Period 
Total quantity: )eδ2c2a2(
b6
1
Q2   
Individual quantities: )e52c2a2(
b12
1
q A2  and )e72c2a2(
b12
1
q B2   
Prices: e
4
1
2
1
c
2
1
a
2
1
r2   and e
6
1
3
1
c
3
1
a
3
2
P2   
Firm M profits: 24Fb)-e²²4-4ecc²44ea-8ac-²a4(
b12
1
M   
Firms DA and DB profits: ²)e52c2a2(
b144
1
A2   and ²)e72c2a2(
b144
1
B2   
 
4.3. Model’s results 
In this section we present the results of each scenario and compare them in order to 
analyze the effects of price cap regulation, cost asymmetry and monopolist strategic 
behavior.  
The results are summarized in a single table that can be found in the Appendix A. 
From the comparison of the results we conclude that there is a result which is verified in 
all scenarios. It is observed that q2A, q2B and Q2 are always higher than q1A, q1B and Q1.  
Moreover, r2 and P2 are always lower than r1 and P1. These results mirror the action of 
price cap regulation on the second period. With a maximum price on the second period, 
that by definition is lower than the price observed on the previous period, quantities rise 
on the second period.  
In the following description of the results we take the simplest scenario, scenario 1, 
as the baseline scenario that will be compared with the others scenarios. 
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In order to analyze the effects of the monopolist strategic behavior we compare 
scenarios 1 and 2. Thus, we compare the situation where the monopolist does not take 
into account the price regulation of the second period with the situation where the 
monopolist strategically sets the quantity of the first period considering the second 
period price cap. The Table 1 shows the results for those scenarios on both periods:  
Where c)(aα  and 6Fb-c²2ac-a²k  with 0α  and 0k   
Table 1: Results Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2 
 
First, all the results of scenario 2 reflect the monopolist strategic behavior since the 
parameter   influences the first period variables. Firm M decides Q1 knowing that he 
will be subject to regulation and so the variables are evidence of that behavior.  
One of the most important results is the value of the monopolist profits. On scenario 1, 
the first period profits are higher than the second’s period, as a consequence of the price 
cap regulation. However, although the quantities of the first period are lower than the 
quantities of the second period, the price charged by M on first period, r1, is higher than 
the price of the second period, r2, which compensates the lower quantities, produced 
and sold. Differently, on scenario 2, firm M has the same profits on both periods which 
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reflect his strategic action. Predicting that he will be subject to a price restriction on the 
next period, and to mitigate his losses, he anticipates and chooses Q1 taking into 
account that fact.  
Additionally, on the second period, the monopolist profits are lower on scenario 1 than 
on scenario 2, which reinforces the importance of M’s strategic action. The same 
happens on first period, if ²2k  . Moreover, the sum of the profits of periods 1 and 2 
is higher on scenario 2 than on scenario 1. Thus, firm M has an advantage on thinking 
strategically and maximizes his profits taking account both periods.  
Furthermore, on scenario 2, as M acts strategically, he charges a higher wholesale price 
than on first scenario, on both periods.  
Finally, as the distribution companies have symmetric costs, they produced the same 
quantities and consequently have the same profits on both periods, in each scenario. 
However, on scenario 1 the quantities (and consequently the profits) are higher than on 
scenario 2, which means that when the monopolist behave strategically, he charges an 
higher r and then DA and DB are not willing to buy the same quantities than on scenario 
1. 
It is curious to note that the increase of the wholesale price from first to second scenario 
is 
2
1
 on both periods (when M behaves strategically r1 and r2 are both influenced by 
the parameter  ). However, on scenario 2, and comparing the first period with the 
second period, r1 increase 
2
1
 while r2 decrease by the same amount of the r1 increase. 
This fact reflects the monopolist action to recover the losses on second period: he 
charges a higher price on first period exactly by the same amount that he will have to 
decrease the price on next period when he will suffer with the price regulation.  
Furthermore, as the distributors have to pay a higher r when M behaves strategically, 
they have to charge a higher P. Thus, in scenario 2 the final prices are higher than on 
scenario 1, on both periods (by the amount of 
3
1
). Again, on scenario 2 and comparing 
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the first period with the second, P1 increase 
3
1
 while P2 decrease by the same amount 
of the increase of P1.  
An identical analysis could be done between scenarios 3 and 4, where is assumed that 
DA and DB have asymmetric costs on both scenarios and the difference is if M acts 
strategically or not. In this comparison what is different from the previous comparison 
is the condition that assures that the firm M profits are lower on scenario 3 than on 
scenario 4, in first period. That condition is given by ²8 . 
To analyze the effect of cost asymmetry between DA and DB we compare scenarios 1 
and 3. These results are synthetized on table 2. 
Where ²eec4ea4k4   
Table 2: Results Scenario 1 vs Scenario 3 
 
The immediate outcome of asymmetric costs is the difference between the individual 
quantities produced and the different profits among the distribution companies, DA and 
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DB. This difference does not happen on first scenario, where they produced exactly the 
same quantities and earned the same profits. 
On scenario 3, DA, as the most efficient firm, produces more than DB, on both periods 
and the DA profits are higher than DB’s. Moreover DA produces more on scenario 3 
comparing with scenario 1 and DB reduces his production. Consequently, the profits of 
DA are higher on scenario 3 and the profits of DB are smaller. This is explained not only 
by the individual quantities produced but also by the value of the wholesale price r. The 
price r on both periods is lower on scenario 3. Then DA has higher profits on scenario 3 
because he produces more at a lower cost. DB, despite the price r reduction, has an 
additional cost, e, that does not allow it to produce as much as on scenario 1 and thus 
his profits fall. Thus, the effects of asymmetric costs are amplified by the reduction of 
prices in the upstream market. 
Additionally, the final prices, P1 and P2 are greater on scenario 3, on both periods. This 
fact also helped to explain the higher profits of DA (produces more at a lower cost 
production and charged a higher price to its customers). Contrarily to what happens on 
scenarios 1 and 2, the action of the upstream monopolist has inverse effects on final 
prices: the wholesale prices are lower on scenario 3 than on scenario 1 but final prices 
are higher. 
The value of the total quantity, on both periods, is lower on scenario 3 than on scenario 
1 which means that the total amount produced is inferior when the companies have 
asymmetric costs. With the price r reduction DA increases its production and DB reduces 
their production but still continue to buy. However the DB reduction is higher than the 
increase of DA. Then the total quantity decrease. The value of total quantity is also 
explained by the value of the final prices: with higher prices the demand decreases. 
Regarding the monopolist profits we conclude that if the cost difference is too high, i.e., 
if )ca(4e  , the M profits are higher on scenario 3, on both periods. Therefore, the 
sum of the first and second period’s profits is also higher on scenario 3 than on scenario 
1 if the previous condition is satisfied. Thus, it could be profitable for firm M if there 
are asymmetric costs between his customers. The fact of  the monopolist decreases the 
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price charged leads to not only more incentives to DA to buy but also to DB still 
continue to buy, despite its cost inefficiency.  
Among scenarios 2 and 4 it is possible to make the same analysis. In that comparison if 
k4  it is guaranteed that the sum of periods 1 and 2 profits is higher on scenario 4 
than on scenario 2.  
Finally, the last comparison was made between the base scenario with the most complex 
scenario, scenario 4 where it is studied the case of M’s strategic behavior with the 
simultaneous existence of asymmetric costs. Table 3 expresses the results for scenarios 
1 and 4. 
Table 3: Results Scenario 1 vs Scenario 4 
 
Regarding the cost asymmetry (in parallel with the analysis for scenario 3) we note that, 
on scenario 4 DA produces more than DB (on both periods) and DA profits are higher 
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than DB’s. Moreover the DA production and profits, on both periods, are higher on 
scenario 4 than on scenario 1, if e
2
5
 .  
As in previous analysis, the total amount produced, Q, is superior on scenario 1, on both 
periods. The reduction on DB production is not offset by the increase on the DA’s 
production. 
Also, if e
2
1
 , firm M sets higher prices on scenario 4. The monopolist charges a 
higher r on period 1, as well as happens on scenario 2, since he knows that there will be 
regulation on following period. However, that price is not as high as in scenario 2 
because in this situation there are asymmetric costs among his clients and for not losing 
too much in the sales to the inefficient one, firm M slightly reduces his price.  
 
Furthermore, on scenario 4, the final price charged to consumers is higher than on 
scenario 1, on both periods. Thus, when there are differences on companies’ costs and 
M acts on a strategic way, the final consumers suffer a price increase.  
 
With regard to monopolist profits, if ²4k2   (for the first period) and 
²4k2   (on second period), M has higher profits on scenario 4. Also, the sum of 
profits of both periods is higher on scenario 4 than on scenario 1, if k2 . Thus, if 
these conditions are satisfied, the monopolist benefit from asymmetric costs between his 
clients and has incentives on behave strategically. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
From the resolution of model, the presented results and the comparisons between the 
created scenarios we can conclude that the price cap regulation is an effective measure 
to reduce monopolist profits and protect the consumers when applied on an industry 
with the characteristics defined on section 4.1. 
The action of price cap regulation is analyzed by the effects of the second period price 
restriction expressed by: -r = r 12 . The parameter   symbolizes the minimum 
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reduction on period’s 2 price due to the effect of the inflation, efficiency gains and 
possible exogenous costs. From the model we conclude that all the second period 
variables are influenced by the parameter  , reflecting the action of price cap 
regulation. That action is also visible when the only firm that works on production 
market, market where it is applied the price regulation, maximize their profits 
strategically. In that situation, the first period variables are also influenced by  . 
Moreover when it is studied the scenarios where there are cost asymmetry between 
distribution firms, all the variables are influenced by the constant e. That constant 
represents the difference among the production costs of the distribution companies. 
Hence, in a market with cost asymmetry the variables values mirror that difference. 
With the application of the price cap regime, the production costs and final prices (r and 
P) suffer a reduction and the market quantities increase (from first to second period). 
Thus, distribution firms can produce more at a lower production cost (they consequently 
earned higher profits) and consumers benefit from extra quantities at a lower price.  
However, as the price charged by production monopolist reduces, he faces a trade-off 
between to sell more at lower price or maximize his profits knowing that will be subject 
to regulation.  
Therefore, when the monopolist has strategic behavior (scenarios 2 and 4) he earned the 
same profits on both periods in order to reduce the effect of the price cap regulation on 
his profits. When he maximize his profits in each period separately (scenarios 1 and 3), 
i.e., when he does not take in account that he will be subject to regulation on second 
period, his profits are higher on first period comparing with the second period.  
Also, if the condition k4  defined in previous section is satisfied it is also satisfied 
that k2 . Hence, it is assured that the production monopolist earns the higher profits 
when he behaves strategically and his clients have cost differences (scenario 4). On the 
opposite case, i.e., when he maximizes his profits with no concerns about the regulation 
that will suffer on next period and his clients have identical costs (scenario 1), he 
receives the lowest profits. Thus, price cap regulation is more effective on reducing 
producer profits when he does not behave strategically. Moreover the monopolist not 
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only has incentives in behave strategically but also benefit when his clients have 
asymmetric costs.  
Regarding the cost asymmetry, when the firms operating on distribution market have 
the same production costs they produce exactly the same and equally shared the profits, 
on both periods. If exist cost asymmetry it is the most efficient firm who produces more 
and earns higher profits.  
Additionally, it may be profitable for firm M if his clients have differences on 
production costs. If the difference on production costs between distribution companies 
is too high, firm M earns higher profits. In that case, the monopolist is willing to reduce 
the price charged on first period for not lose the inefficient firms (what could happen as 
an outcome of the impossibility of those firms resist on market). Thus, the greater the 
cost asymmetry, the greater is the incentive of the monopolist to behave strategically. 
With concern to the price charged by the monopolist firm we note that this price is 
higher when the monopolist strategically maximizes his profits and his clients have 
identical costs. On the contrary, that price is the lowest when the monopolist clients 
have asymmetric costs. Thus, the distribution companies also benefit with the existence 
of asymmetric costs, specially the most efficient one, since it has no additional 
production costs. 
Furthermore, it is in the case when the distribution firms have identical costs and the 
monopolist working on production market does not behave strategically (scenario 1) 
that the final price is the lowest and the total amount available on the market is higher, 
on both periods. The consumers have more benefits on that case. On the contrary, when 
there is cost asymmetry and strategic behavior by the upstream monopolist (scenario 4) 
the total quantity available is the lowest and the final price charged to consumers is the 
biggest of all scenarios. Moreover, when the monopolist has a strategic maximization 
profits and assuming that his clients has identical costs (scenario 2) the final price paid 
by the consumers is higher. In these situations the consumers lose. 
Finally, we can conclude that although the price cap regulation is an effective measure 
there is no scenario where all the economic agents benefit. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic regulation is used when there are market failures which require the 
government intervention to increase the market competition, to reduce prices on 
essential goods or even to reduce profits higher than the normal ones. These excess 
profits can be the result of one of the market failures studied in economics: market 
power exercised by companies.  
On tobacco market, the market power exercised by tobacco producers, on a global scale, 
is one of the failures. The “Big-Four” group of tobacco industry holds around 70% of 
world market share. In Portugal, one of the companies that belong to that group has a 
subsidiary in the country. That company is the higher tobacco company and one of the 
largest companies in Portugal. 
The literature has intensely discussed the features of price cap regulation and tobacco 
market but has never related this type of regulation to tobacco market until 2010. 
Gilmore et al. (2010) were the first to suggest that the application of price cap 
regulation on tobacco market could raise government revenue and bring benefits to 
public health. The following work of Branston and Gilmore (2014) applied this idea to 
United Kingdom and using the profits range evidenced by some European transnational 
companies operating in more competitive markets the authors reach some interesting 
conclusions about tobacco market. 
This dissertation arises following these previous works and contributes to understand 
the flexibility of price cap regulation and how such instrument could change tobacco 
market. Thus, the main goals of this dissertation were to study the economic effects of 
price cap regulation imposed to tobacco producers and to answer the following research 
questions: “Does price cap regulation reduce producer’s profits?” and “How price cap 
regulation affects the government revenue and consumer welfare?” 
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To achieve these objectives, we built a theoretical model inspired on the characteristics 
of Portuguese tobacco industry. That model sought to study the effects of price cap 
regulation on a market with the characteristics defined on Chapter 4. The model allows 
the understanding of what happens if the monopolist operating on production market 
has a strategic thinking, anticipating the effects of regulation. In addition, the model 
included the study of asymmetric costs between distribution companies, which makes 
one of the firms more efficient than the others.  
From the analyses of the results we conclude that price cap regulation is an effective 
policy instrument since it reduces the price charged by producers to distribution 
companies, which is the immediate result of the price cap imposed to tobacco 
producers. Furthermore the final price is also reduced and the quantities produced are 
increased.  
One of the conclusions which enable to answer the research question is that producer’s 
profits are reduced by price cap regulation but only when the firm does not behave 
strategically. This is a very important conclusion, especially to regulators. It is expected 
that a large company quickly adopts a strategic behavior after the implementation of the 
price regulation. Thus, the regulator must take into account this conclusion. 
Another important conclusion is that price cap regulation reduces the final price charged 
to consumers. It would be a good signal if tobacco was a good with no health 
consequences, which is not the case. Nevertheless and following the proposal of 
Gilmore et al. (2010), the final prices do not suffer any changes, in order to not 
encourage tobacco consumption (especially between the youth) and consequently bring 
benefits to public health. Therefore, the difference would be reestablished by tax 
increasing. So, the government revenue would rise by 
3
2
 of the net effect of the 
inflation, expected efficiency gains and exogenous costs when the producer does not 
behave strategically and by 
3
1
 of that effect when he strategically maximizes his profits. 
Thus, the tax revenue that can be collected by the government is higher when there is no 
strategic behavior.  
 
 
  44 
  
On a final note, the consumer only benefit of larger quantities available on the market. 
One of the model’s results is that after price cap regulation the prices are lower and the 
quantities are higher. However, if this measure is applied to tobacco market it must be 
ensured that final price is maintained (by applying the suggestion of Gilmore et al. 
(2010)). Therefore, the consumer welfare can be increased since they pay exactly the 
same price for more quantities.  
The theoretical model presented can be applied to any market with similar features as 
those considered. Moreover, for future research it would be important to study the case 
of upstream competition and the situation where the firms have an informational 
advantage against the regulator (with respect to production costs or to the demand faced 
by firms, for instance). Finally, if price cap regulation is implemented it would be 
interesting to analyze, through simulations with real data, if the results obtained in the 
model occur. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Results 
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